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Abstract In this essay, I shall show first of all that the so-
called inferential (Suárez 2003 and 2004) and interpretational 
(Contessa 2007) accounts of scientific representation are 
respectively unsatisfactory and too weak to account for 
scientific representation (pars destruens). Along the way, I 
shall also argue that the pragmatic similarity (Giere 2004 and 
2010) and the partial isomorphism (da Costa and French 2003 
and French 2003) accounts are unable to single out scientific 
representation. In the pars construens I spell out a limiting 
case account which has explanatory surplus vis à vis the 
approaches which I have previously reviewed. My account 
offers an adequate treatment of scientific representation, or so 
I shall try to argue. Central to my account is the notion of a 
pragmatic limiting case, which will be characterized in due 
course. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Scientific representation is a many-headed beast which involves a 
game of “selective resemblance and non-resemblance” (van 
Fraassen 2008, p. 14). In recent years there has been a growing 
literature which endeavours to address the constitution problem of 
scientific representation (for instance, Callender and Craig 2006, 
Contessa 2007, French 2003, Frigg 2006, Giere 2004 and 2010, 
Hughes 1997, Suárez 2003 and 2004). In this paper, I pave the way 
for a new proposal: the limiting case account of scientific 
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representation, which will be spelled out in section 5. I will focus 
on the constitution question of scientific representation: in virtue of 
what does a model scientifically represent a part of the empirical 
world? In shall begin this essay by questioning the tenability of 
Callender and Craig’s view that there is no special problem of 
scientific representation in section 2. In section 3 I argue that 
Suárez’ deflationary proposal cannot provide a satisfactory answer 
to the issue at hand and, in section 4, I argue that Contessa’s 
interpretational account is incomplete as it stands.  
 
 
2 Griceanism and its Problems 
 
Some have argued that there is no such thing as the problem of 
scientific representation. Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen have 
recently suggested that if we adopt a General Gricean approach to 
representation, “we won’t need separate theories to account for 
artistic, linguistic, representation, and culinary representation; 
instead the General Gricean proposes that all these types of 
representation can be explained (in a unified way) as deriving from 
some more fundamental sorts of representations, which are 
typically taken to be mental states,” a treatment which they deem 
“economical and natural” (Callender and Cohen 2006, p. 70, cf. p. 
75). Their general explanatory strategy encompasses the view that 
“virtually anything can be stipulated to be a representational 
vehicle for the representation of virtually anything” – a view to 
which Steven French has objected by pointing out that not 
everything can serve as a scientific model of a physical system, for 
“if the appropriate relationships are not in place between the 
relevant properties then the “model” will not be deemed scientific” 
(French 2003, p. 1478) – although “there are plausibly pragmatic 
constraints on which representational vehicles and targets are used 
in particular cases” (Callender and Cohen 2006, p. 74). To 
objections à la French they respond: “We propose that intuitions to 
the effect that such and such cannot serve as a model are best 
understood as reflecting the unlikelihood of anyone’s using such 
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and such as a model, given certain assumptions about pragmatic 
purposes.” (ibid., p. 76, footnote 6 [italics added]). While all 
representational vehicles have the capacity of serving as full-
blooded representational vehicles in principle, they may not do so 
in practice because they fail to serve the purposes at hand (ibid., pp. 
74-75). Just as in non-scientific representation, the questions about 
the utility of representational vehicles are questions about the 
pragmatics of things that are representational vehicles, not 
questions about their representational status per se (ibid., p. 75). 
Hence: “while there may be outstanding issues about 
representation, there is no special problem about scientific 
representation” (ibid., p. 77, cf. p. 83). Exit the problem of 
scientific representation? 
Does it follow from Callender and Cohen’s premise, that the 
capacity of all kinds of representation (linguistic, artistic, scientific, 
etc.) are constrained by pragmatic considerations, that there is no 
problem of scientific representation at all? Callender and Cohen’s 
far-reaching conclusion seems to follow only if they are able to 
show that the pragmatic elements constraining both artistic as well 
as scientific representation are not fundamentally different from 
each other. In other words, what they fail to show is that there are 
no relevant differences qua domain-specific pragmatics in artistic 
and scientific representation. Artists are in numerous cases 
constrained in their use of materials of choice of colours by the 
emotions or thought processes they seek to elicit in their audiences. 
The painting The Third of May (1814) would not have its dramatic 
effect had Francisco de Goya used vivid colours and a bright 
background to represent the horrors of Napoleon’s soldiers against 
the Spanish in 1808. On the other hand, scientists are constrained in 
their choice of models by the kinds of descriptions or explanations 
of particular natural phenomena they seek to provide.1 For instance, 
when studying a continuous phenomenon, a non-continuous 
function will not be first choice. It is true that artists’ and scientists’ 
                                                 
1
 All I need to assume here is that in scientific representation providing 
descriptions or explanations of natural phenomena is the dominant pragmatic 
constraint. 
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choices for a specific representational vehicle are constrained by 
pragmatic considerations, but they are constrained by pragmatic 
considerations of a different kind. Unless Callender and Cohen 
show that such differences qua pragmatic elements are not relevant, 
their conclusion that there is no problem of scientific representation 
does not follow. Moreover, their general and economical 
framework, according to which “the varied representational 
vehicles used in scientific settings (models, equations, toothpick 
constructions, drawings, etc.) represent their targets (the behaviour 
of ideal gases, quantum state evolution, bridges), by virtue of the 
mental states of their makers/users” (ibid., p. 75 [italics added]), 
comes at a high price in terms of explanatory power – in my 
opinion, at a price too high. An account of scientific representation 
needs to explain in more detail how it is that we can draw 
inferences from representations in science, to come up with a more 
elaborate picture about the pragmatics of scientific representation, 
and to show how scientific representations can be seen as distinct 
from non-scientific representations. Callender and Cohen’s account 
remains silent on these matters and nothing particularly useful 
follows from it in terms of coming to terms with concrete scientific 
representations. Accepting Callender and Cohen’s proposal means 
giving up on scientific representation all too soon.2 
 
 
3 Deflationism and its Problems 
 
Mauricio Suárez has defended a position which is less radical than 
Callender and Cohen’s Gricean account: deflationism. 
Characteristic of his account is the refusal to spell out what counts 
as realizing the “surface features” of scientific representation. In 
their early work on scientific representation, both Ronald N. Giere 
and Bas C. van Fraassen embraced standard similarity and 
isomorphism (see Giere 1988, p. 80, Giere 1999 and van Fraassen 
1980, p. 45, p. 64). In two recent thought-provoking papers, Suárez 
has tried to debunk similarity [sim], according to which A 
                                                 
2
 In section 5 I shall provide additional support of the claims made here. 
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represents B if and only if A is similar to B, and isomorphism [iso], 
according to which A represents B if and only if the structure 
exemplified by A is isomorphic to the structure exhibiting by B, as 
adequate explications of scientific representation, by arguing that 
[sim] and [iso] do not qualify as the constituents of scientific 
representation, which he defines as follows, “the relation R 
between A and B are the constituents of representation of B by A if 
and only if R’s obtaining is necessary and sufficient for A to 
represent B” (Suárez 2003, p. 230). Suárez’ criticism is directed at 
“theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to 
similarity or isomorphism” (Suárez 2003, p. 225 [italics added]). 
Moreover, “[t]hese reductive theories aim to radically naturalize 
the notion of representation, since they treat scientists’ purposes 
and intentions as non-essential to representation” (ibid. [italics 
added]).3 According to Suárez, [sim] and [iso] are facts about the 
source and target objects (and their properties), not about the 
essentially intentional judgements of representation-users – 
scientific representation is triadic instead of dyadic. Scientific 
representation is a not an object-object relation but rather a relation 
between objects and the internal states of their users. 
A substantive account of scientific representation “provides 
us with necessary and sufficient conditions for a source to represent 
its target” (Suárez 2003, p. 226). Suárez proposal furthermore 
encompasses the view that we should take a “deflationary” or 
“minimist” attitude towards scientific representation (Suárez 2004, 
pp. 770-771), which basically entails two things: (1) we should 
abandon the quest for a substantive theory because representation is 
not “the kind of thing that requires, or admits” such theory and (2) 
we can at best aim to describe its “surface features” of 
representations and should stop seeking for “deeper features to 
representation” (ibid., p. 771). According to Suárez’ inferential 
account, the two surface features are: the representational force of a 
source and the capacity of surrogate reasoning, i.e. the capacity of 
                                                 
3
 In this context, Suárez refers to Giere 1988 and 1999 and van Fraassen 
1980 as defences of [sim] and [iso], respectively (Suárez 2003, p. 227). 
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drawing inferences about the target from the model. 
Correspondingly, he defines representation as: 
 
[inf]: A represents B if only (i) the representational force of A points 
toward B, and (ii) A allows competent and informed agents to draw 
specific inferences regarding B. (Suárez 2004, p. 773) 
 
(i) and (ii) are obviously necessary conditions. 4 The type and level 
of competence and information required in the surrogate reasoning 
process, which may be deductive, inductive, analogical, etc., is a 
pragmatic skill that depends on the aim and the context of the 
inquiry. In a sense, all has been said about representation in science.  
Suárez makes it sound as if unravelling only necessary 
conditions for scientific representation is what endorsing a 
deflationary stance amounts to. However, the difference between 
endorsing a deflationary versus a substantive stance does not 
consist in the addition or subtraction of sufficient conditions. What 
makes an account deflationary is not the absence of the sufficient 
conditions, but rather the refusal to further spell out what counts as 
realizing the representational force and the capacity for surrogate 
reasoning. Rather than being an account of scientific representation, 
[inf] is thus the general form of an account of representation: it is 
the blank to be filled in every instance of representation. 
Deflationism amounts to the view that a theory of representation 
should not fill in this blank. 
The problem is, however, that Suárez provides no real 
argument for the claim that a substantive account of scientific 
representation is impossible in principle (cf. Contessa 2007, pp. 49-
50). Suárez furthermore explicates representation in terms of 
representational force and the capacity for surrogate reasoning. 
Now, unless an detailed account of representational force is 
provided, which is currently lacking in Suárez’ account, nothing 
much has been gained. Up until the present, he has simply replaced 
                                                 
4
 Suárez notes that he has “little to say about what makes one 
representation more accurate than another” (Suárez 2003, p. 226). Suárez 
explicitly deals with the constitution question of scientific representation and not 
with the normative question of scientific representation. 
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ignotum per ignotum. Moreover, what we expect from an account 
of scientific representation is not so much the mere statement that 
we can make inferences, but rather an explanation of why and how 
it is that we can make such inferences.  
Suárez furthermore offers five arguments against [sim] and 
[iso] (Suárez 2003, pp. 230-237): 
 
1. The argument of variety: [sim] and [iso] do not apply to all 
representational devises. 
2. The logical argument: [sim] and [iso] do not possess the logical 
properties of representation.5 
3. The argument from misrepresentation: [sim] and [iso] do not make 
room for the ubiquitous phenomena of mistargeting and/or 
inaccuracy. 
4. The non-necessity argument: [sim] and [iso] are not necessary for 
representation – the relation of representation may obtain even if 
[sim] or [iso] fail. 
5. The non-sufficiency argument: [sim] and [iso] are not sufficient for 
representation – the relation of representation may fail to obtain 
even if [sim], or [iso] hold. 
 
However, his counterarguments only establish that naive [sim] and 
[iso] aren’t necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific 
representation. According to Suárez, the defenders of the [sim] or 
[iso] account endorse the view that A represents B, if and only if, A 
is similar to B or, if and only if, the structure exemplified by A is 
isomorphic to the structure exhibiting by B, respectively.6 I shall 
label this similarity/isomorphism account naive 
similarity/isomorphism, because by definition it does not refer to 
the pragmatic aspects of scientific representation. Naive [sim] and 
[iso] clearly are untenable. For instance: in certain contexts, a user 
may consider a deck of cards to be similar or isomorphic to a pack 
of cigarettes. But nobody would contend that by itself the pack of 
cigarettes represents the deck of cards. If relevant interpretations by 
users are added, a deck of cards can represent a pack of cigarettes 
as is clear from the following example. Suppose, for instance, that 
                                                 
5
 This argument against [iso] and [sim] is taken over in Frigg 2006. 
6
 I consider [iso], similarity qua form, as a specific version of [sim]. 
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an individual seeks to estimate roughly the volume needed to stash 
3,000 packs of cigarettes but has no pack of cigarettes at hand. 
Suppose further that this individual does have a deck of cards in 
one of his pockets. He or she could estimate the required volume 
by calculating the volume needed to store 3,000 decks of cards, 
which (roughly) represent the volume of an identical number of 
packs of cigarettes. By adding certain pragmatic elements, the 
volume of the decks of cards represents the volume of the packs of 
cigarettes. This type of similarity I consider as pragmatic 
similarity/isomorphism, since it refers to the choice of one 
particular similarity/isomorphism relation to do the representing. In 
his later work on the matter, van Fraassen has emphasized the 
pragmatic dimension of representation and, more specifically he 
has argued that there are four characteristics involved in 
representation: (1) intentionality, which presupposes specific 
“reading conventions,” (2) selectivity of aspects, (3) accuracy, 
which admits several degrees of fitting, and (4) context-relativity, 
which is entailed by the preceding characteristics) (van Fraassen 
1994, p. 171; cf. van Fraassen 2008, pp. 22-26, p. 76). Da Costa 
and French have also emphasized the pragmatic features of  their 
partial isomorphism proposal (da Costa and French 2003, pp. 16-20, 
pp. 33-36) and, recently, Giere has also come to focus on the 
pragmatic dimensions of similarity (Giere 2004, p. 743). 
Accordingly, scientific representation is essentially triadic: a 
subject uses a model to represent a physical system for certain 
purposes (ibid.). Giere explicitly rejects standard similarity: he 
notes that a model and a physical system are not similar by 
themselves (ibid., p. 747; id. 2010, pp. 274-275).7 
                                                 
7
 Others have also endorsed pragmatic [sim] (Teller 2001 and Bailor-
Jones 2003). According to Teller, what counts as similarity will depend on the 
level of accuracy one requires: “if the aim is prediction or explanation of 
quantitative detail one will need to specify the interests of the model users in 
more detail” (Teller 2001, p. 401 [emphasis added]). Moreover, he notes that 
because of the context-sensitivity involved in scientific representation, no 
general account of relevant similarity is required: “No general account is needed 
precisely because it is the specifics of any case at hand which provide the basis 
for saying what counts as relevant similarity. In other words, the very facts 
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As Suárez’ logical argument is directed at proponents of 
naive [sim] and [iso], his criticism does not seem to affect the 
pragmatic [sim] or [iso] accounts. That being said, it does not 
follow that pragmatic [sim] or [iso] provide an adequate solution to 
the constitution problem of scientific representation (see 5.1). 
 
 
4 The Interpretational Proposal 
 
Gabriele Contessa’s interpretational account differs from Suárez 
inferential account in that it seeks to provide a substantive account 
of scientific representation (Contessa 2007). Contessa begins by 
distinguishing between three different meanings of representation: 
denotation, epistemic representation and faithful representation 
(ibid., pp. 52-56). The logo of the London Underground and a map 
of the London Underground denote the London Underground 
network. Denotation may be a matter of convention. However, 
contrary to the logo of the London Underground, a map of the 
London Underground represents the underground network in a 
stronger sense: namely, a user can perform (valid but not necessarily 
sound) surrogate inferences from the map to the network. This is an 
instance of what Contessa calls an epistemic representation. A 
vehicle 8  is an epistemic representation of a certain target for a 
certain user if and only if the user is able to perform valid (though 
not necessarily sound) surrogate inferences from the vehicle to the 
target (ibid., p. 48, pp. 52-53, p. 67). Faithful, i.e. valid and sound, 
representation occurs when a vehicle (model) allows surrogate 
inferences that are not only valid but also sound, i.e. true of its target. 
Soundness is a matter of degree: a vehicle (model) does not need to 
be a perfect replica of its target: it faithfully represents some aspects 
                                                                                                              
which make this demand impossible to meet also show that the demand was 
misguided to begin with.” (ibid.). Daniela Bailer-Jones also endorsed pragmatic 
[sim], for she stressed that the users of models should agree upon the function for 
which a model is intended, decide which allowances are made for the model not 
to fit the data or the laws of nature, and select the aspects of a phenomenon 
which a model represents (Bailer-Jones 2003, p. 72). 
8
 Note that ‘vehicle’ and ‘model’ are used interchangeably by Contessa. 
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of the target and misrepresents other aspects (ibid., pp. 55-56, p. 60). 
Contessa’s aim is to provide an adequate account of epistemic 
representation – while leaving over an account of faithful 
representation for future research (ibid., pp. 67-68).  
According to Contessa, a vehicle is an epistemic 
representation of a certain target for a certain user if and only if the 
user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target 
(ibid.). A user interprets a vehicle in terms of a target if he takes 
facts about the vehicle to stand for (putative) facts about the target 
(ibid.). The notion of interpretation is spelled out in terms of 
analytic interpretation: a user adopts an analytic interpretation of a 
vehicle in terms of a target, if and only if (ibid., p. 58): 
 
1. The user takes the vehicle to denote the target, 
2. The user takes every object in ΩV [the non-empty set of relevant 
objects in the vehicle] to denote one and only one object in ΩT [the 
non-empty set of relevant objects in the target] and every object in 
Ω
T
 to be denoted by one and only one object in ΩV, 
3. The user takes every n-ary relation in PV [the possibly empty set 
of relevant properties and relations among objects in the vehicle] to 
denote one and only one relevant n-ary in PT [the possibly empty set 
of relevant properties and relations among objects in the target] and 
every n-ary relation in PT to be denoted by one and only one n-ary 
relation in PV. 
4. They take every n-ary function in ΦV [the set of relevant functions 
from (ΩV)n to ΩV] to denote one and only one relevant n-ary function 
in ΦT [the set of relevant functions from (ΩT)n to ΩT] and every n-ary 
function in ΦT to be denoted by one and only one n-ary relation in 
Φ
V
. 
 
Contessa admits that not all but most scientific representations are 
analytic interpretations and adds that focussing on analytic 
representation will “simplify the discussion without any loss of 
generality” (ibid., p. 58). Contessa’s account clearly does not 
require that every object in the model denotes some object in the 
corresponding system or that the objects in the system actually have 
all the properties instantiated by the objects that stand for them in 
the model (ibid., p. 59). A user’s background knowledge will allow 
“to assess which properties of objects of the model are idealizations 
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or approximations and would lead to unsound inferences about the 
properties of the corresponding objects in the system” (ibid., p. 60). 
In comparison to Suárez’ approach on the subject, Contessa’s 
proposal is certainly appealing since it is more explanatory of 
scientific representation. Contessa notes: “On the inferential 
conception, the user’s ability to perform inferences from a vehicle to 
a target seems to be a brute fact, which has no deeper explanation. 
[…] On the interpretational conception, on the other hand, a user’s 
ability to perform pieces of surrogate reasoning not only is not a 
mysterious skill but it is an activity that is deeply connected to the 
fact that the vehicle is an epistemic representation of the target for 
that user.” (ibid., p. 61). In other words, (analytic) interpretation is 
not just a surface feature or symptom of representation: one 
performs surrogate inferences in virtue of the fact that the user 
interprets the vehicle in terms of the target. 
However, Contessa’s account of epistemic representation or 
analytic interpretation is at best incomplete as it stands. According 
to Contessa’s substantial account, scientific representation basically 
occurs if and only if: (1) a user takes the model as a whole to stand 
for a target, (2) a user takes some of the components of the model 
to stand for some of the components of the target, and (3) a user 
takes some of the properties of and relations among the objects in 
the model to stand for some of the properties of and relations 
among the objects of the target (ibid., p. 59). Note that an answer to 
the question in virtue of what does ΩV/PV denote ΩT/PT is not 
provided. The problem with Contessa’s proposal is that the notion 
of denotation, on which his account is based, is too weak to 
characterize scientific representation, as is shown by the following 
example. The example below meets Contessa’s requirements for 
analytic interpretation, but it does not seem to qualify as a scientific 
representation. Suppose that seven runners have just competed in a 
contest. After the finish we take a group picture with all runners 
standing next to each other in a random fashion. Next, above each 
of the runners on the photograph we add identical circles coloured 
with one of the seven primary colours. Additionally, we denote the 
runner who had the best time in the contest by the colour with the 
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highest wavelength, the runner who had the second best time by the 
colour with the second highest wavelength, and so on for all other 
runners. On the basis of this interpretation, we can infer, for 
instance, that the individual on the photograph with a green circle 
above finished fourth. This qualifies as an analytic interpretation 
since we take the colours – ordered in terms of their wavelengths 
(from highest to smallest) – to denote the order of who finished 
(from first to last). We take the relation having highest wavelength 
to stand for being the fastest runner, having the second highest 
wavelength for being the second fastest runner, and so on. 
However, this example does not seem to qualify as a 
straightforward scientific representation. Denotation alone, it seems, 
is too weak to capture scientific representation. 
If the above line of reasoning is correct, then something is 
missing in Contessa’s proposal. If it can be made plausible that 
vehicles scientifically represent their targets in virtue of a more 
fundamental relation between vehicles and their targets, which is 
exactly what I endeavour to do in the following section, then it is 
possible to advance upon Contessa’s account and to arrive at a more 
adequate explication of scientific with an explanatory surplus. 
 
 
5 The Pragmatic Higher-level Limiting Case Account of 
Scientific Representation 
 
5.1 Preliminaries and Motivation 
 
An account of scientific representation should keep the question in 
virtue of what does a scientific representation represent a certain 
system (i.e., the constitution problem of scientific representation) 
separate from the question in virtue of what does a representation 
represent a certain system accurately or truthfully (i.e. the 
normative problem of representation) (Suárez 2004, pp. 767-768). 
Correspondingly, I shall deal with both issues separately in 
subsection 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. 
At the end of the previous section, I have argued that 
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denotation by itself is too weak to explicate scientific 
representation. It seems therefore that a more fundamental relation 
between models (M) and their targets (T) is required to explain why 
users interpret scientific models analytically in the first place. 
Defenders of pragmatic similarity (Giere 2004 and 2010), partial 
isomorphism (da Costa and French 2003 and French 2003), and 
homomorphism (Mundy 1986) all claim to have found this more 
basic relation. I will try to argue that they are misguided in this 
assumption.9 
Let us begin with a quick discussion of the partial 
isomorphism account and the pragmatic similarity account, 
respectively. A partial structure, A, is defined as set-theoretic 
structure: A = <D, Ri>i ∈ I, where D is the (non-empty) domain and 
each Ri is a partial relation (da Costa and French 2003, pp. 16-20 
and French 2003, p. 1480). Characteristic of a partial structure is 
that the relations are defined only for some elements of the domain. 
Each partial relation can be viewed as an ordered triple <R1, R2, 
R3>, where R1, R2, and R3 are mutually disjoint sets such that R1 ∪ 
R2 ∪ R3 = An and such that R1 is the set of n-tuples that belong to R, 
R2 is the set of n-tuples that do not belong to R, and R3 is the set of 
n-tuples for which it is not defined whether they belong to R or 
not. 10  Accordingly, partial isomorphism between two partial 
structures A and A' obtains, if and only if, a partial substructure of A 
is isomorphic to a partial substructure of A' (da Costa and French 
2003, p. 49 and French 2003, p. 1480). According to da Costa and 
French, the above formal characterization captures an important 
feature of scientific representations, namely that they involve 
idealizations and approximations: 
 
Both our everyday and scientific beliefs concern representations that 
are not determinate, not tight, not complete; they are idealizations 
and approximations, they are imperfect, and they are partial, 
                                                 
9
 As the arguments against (pragmatic) homomorphism are analogous to 
those against (pragmatic) similarity, I will omit further discussion of 
homomorphism in what follows. 
10
 Note that in the limiting case, where R3 is empty, a partial structure 
becomes a total structure. 
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reflecting our partial knowledge and understanding of the world. (da 
Costa and French 2003, p. 17, cf. p. 19) 
 
In this context, it is claimed that idealization, abstraction and 
approximation can be accommodated within the partial 
isomorphism account (French 2003, p. 1480).11 According to Giere, 
the basic representative relationship between models and the world 
is (pragmatic) similarity (Giere 2010, p. 269). That is to say, in 
virtue of certain specified similarities between the model and its 
target scientists represent certain aspects of the world (Giere 2004, 
pp. 747-748). What this means is that a model is considered to be 
similar to its target in certain respects and to certain degrees for a 
purpose P. Therefore, given the clarifier “in certain respects and to 
certain degrees,” Giere equally suggests that idealization and 
abstraction can be accommodated within his pragmatic similarity 
approach. In the following two paragraphs, I shall pinpoint why the 
partial isomorphism account and the pragmatic similarity account 
fail to explicate scientific representation. 
It is clear that da Costa and French, on the one hand, and, 
Giere, on the other hand, aim to explicate scientific representation. 
However, given the way that they seek to cash out scientific 
representation it is not at all clear that their respective accounts are 
able to single out scientific representations, for pragmatic similarity 
and partial isomorphism obtains in non-scientific representation as 
well. Consider Louis François Roubillac’s famous statue of Isaac 
Newton at the Chapel of Trinity College, University of Cambridge. 
This statue is, as most would accept, clearly similar to the historical 
Isaac Newton. Although Roubillac added certain artistic elements 
for the purpose of providing a dignified representation of this 
particular Lucasian Professor of Mathematics, Newton’s facial 
features are quite accurately represented. However, Roubillac’s 
statue does not, for example, accurately represent Newton’s true 
                                                 
11
 In what follows I shall focus on idealization and abstraction. An 
idealization refers to a conceptual scheme which deliberately distorts certain 
properties of a physical system when modelling it; an abstraction on the other 
hand refers to a conceptual scheme which omits certain properties of a physical 
system when modelling it (Cartwright 1989, pp. 185-198). 
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stature and bodily proportions nor the true colours of his hair or 
skin. That is to say, Roubillac’s statue is similar to Isaac Newton in 
certain respects and to certain degrees and in virtue of that it 
represents Newton. Based on similar considerations, one can 
equally maintain that partial isomorphism obtains between, for 
instance, the facial features of the statue and those of Isaac Newton 
and that it is in virtue of that that it represents Newton. This 
example can be accounted for by both accounts. The point here, 
however, is that the pragmatic similarity account and the partial 
isomorphism account do not have the resources to rule out the 
above example as a case of scientific representation. What this 
example suggests then is that, in order to account for scientific 
representation, something more is required than (1) introducing 
some kind of formal relation which obtains between a vehicle and 
its target, i.e. pragmatic similarity or partial isomorphism, and (2) 
focussing on the pragmatic and intentional considerations which 
enter into the ascription of such relations. Or, differently put, 
neither approach is explanatory of scientific representation. It is the 
search for that “something more” that, of course, motivates my 
own proposal on the matter. My claim will be that that “something 
else” enables us to single out scientific representations. 
In a nutshell, my objection is that by explicating scientific 
representations in terms of certain formal relations, which obtain 
either “partially” or “in certain respects and to certain degrees,” one 
cannot single out scientific representation proper. What needs to be 
incorporated in an account of scientific representation are the ways 
in which ascriptions of pragmatic similarity or partial isomorphism 
are arrived at. Such ascriptions are typically arrived at by the 
introduction of certain idealizing and abstracting assumptions. 
That is, the important thing to realize is that pragmatic similarity 
and partial isomorphism only obtain in view of certain idealizing 
and abstracting assumptions; or phrased differently, the idealizing 
and abstracting assumptions are that which ground users’ 
ascriptions of pragmatic similarity or partial isomorphism between 
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a vehicle and its target.12 As we will shortly see, in my account the 
introduction of certain idealizing and abstracting assumptions is 
what sets scientific representation apart from other forms of 
representation. The crucial difference between the account which 
will be spelled out in what follows, on the one hand, and the 
pragmatic similarity or partial isomorphism account, on the other, 
lies in the different way in which the relation between abstraction-
idealization and the existence of certain formal relations between 
the vehicle and its target is characterized. According to the latter, 
pragmatic similarity or partial isomorphism are the explanantes of 
idealization-abstraction; according to the former, it is the other way 
around: idealization and abstraction are the explanantes of the 
ascription of certain formal relations between the vehicle and its 
target. By placing idealization and abstraction at the heart of one’s 
explication of scientific representation, as is done by introducing 
the notion of a pragmatic limiting case in 5.2,13 the problem that 
vexes the pragmatic similarity account and the partial isomorphism 
account can be evaded, i.e. on the basis of this notion we will be 
able to single out scientific representations proper. 
 
5.2 Outline of the Limiting Case Account 
 
I shall begin by clarifying the notion of a pragmatic limiting case. 
To do so, I shall introduce the following conventions: 
 
 = the set of relevant objects of M  
 = the set of relevant objects of T  
 = the set of relevant relations among  
                                                 
12
 In Pincock 2005, pp. 1253-1255 related concerns are raised against 
partial isomorphism. 
13
 That a model is a pragmatic limiting case of its target means that: (1) M 
provides a ceteris paribus and ceteris absentibus conceptualization of its target – 
i.e. it treats its target in a highly abstracted and idealized way, as it cuts loose 
from the complexity of the empirical world and deliberately distorts it – and (2) 
M allows for the inference of certain relations which are not inferable from the 
target itself, but which hold approximately for the target relative to a purpose P. 
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 = the set of relevant relations among  
 
It is very important to remark that properties, as in the remainder of 
this section, are construed as 1-ary relations and that relations 
include functions. Therefore when I speak of relations in what 
follows I refer to properties of objects – construed as 1-ary 
relations, relations among objects and functions between objects. 
That M is a pragmatic limiting case of T is then characterized as 
follows: 
 
M is a pragmatic limiting case of T for purpose P, if and 
only if: 
 
1.    describes an ideal ceteris paribus and ceteris 
absentibus state of affairs, 
2.    given the ideal state of affairs , a relation r holds 
exactly (where r is the sort of a relation of which we 
can determine the extent to which it holds 
empirically), 
3.   r obtains approximately for  relative to a purpose 
P, 
4.    given that r holds exactly in 	and approximately 
in   relative to a purpose P, a one-on-one 
correspondence is predicated between   and  
and between  and . 
 
Given the above characterization, I propose the following 
characterization of scientific representation: 
 
M represents T scientifically, if and only if, M is a 
pragmatic limiting case of T for purpose P. 
 
An example is in order here. For some purposes, one may represent 
the orbital motion of the moon around the earth by a Newtonian 
one-body system. A one-body system provides an highly abstract 
and idealized picture of the moon’s motion around the sun: it does 
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not take into account other forces (for instance, the gravitational 
force of the sun), moreover, since the centre of the earth is 
considered as an empty force centre it does not take into account 
the moon’s reaction force, and, finally, it treats the moon’s orbital 
motion as perfectly circular and uniform. Given this ideal state of 
affairs one can establish that Kepler’s area law holds exactly –  
note that it can be determined empirically whether attracted bodies 
describe areas proportional to their times. Put differently, a one-
body system provides us with an ideal state of affairs under which 
Kepler’s area law would hold exactly; however, due to the presence 
of disturbing forces Kepler’s area law does not hold exactly in our 
solar system, but only approximately. Correspondingly, in this 
model, the body will be interpreted as the moon, the circular 
trajectory will be interpreted as the actual path of the moon, and the 
empty centre of force will be interpreted as the centre of the earth. 
Similarly, the body orbiting around the empty force centre will 
stand for the moon orbiting around the earth and the body being 
attracted by the empty centre of force will stand for the moon 
being attracted by the earth. In contrast to Contessa’s account, my 
account explains how denotation gets there in the first place: 
namely, because a relation, which obtains exactly under , holds 
approximately under   relative to a purpose P. (By treating 
scientific representations as limiting cases of their corresponding 
targets, we are likewise able to explain how it is that users consider 
a model similar, quasi isomorphic or homomorphic to its targets in 
the first place.)  
As will be shown below, the above limiting case account 
does not necessarily require that the relations among the M-objects, 
which are limiting cases of the relations among the T-objects, are 
first-order. First-order relations have only objects as their 
arguments. Correspondingly, second-order relations have first-
order relations as their arguments. And so on, for all other higher-
order relations. When a set of first-order M-relations is a pragmatic 
limiting case of a set of first-order T-relations, I shall denote this as 

	

 is a pragmatic limiting case of 	
. Constraining oneself to 
	
  does not seem to do justice to the potential abstractness of 
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scientific representations. A probability model of a set of first-order 
relations is an illustration of 	, where a set of second-order M-
relations (the probability distribution of certain first-order M-
relations) is a limiting case of a set of second-order T-relations (the 
probability distribution of the corresponding first-order T-relations). 
Probability predicates (and the like) can be applied to second-order 
properties, in which case 	 obtains – and so on, for all higher-
order cases. The outcome of this is that 	 can potentially be very 
complex and situated at various levels of abstractness.  
Let me provide a more complicated example. Quantum 
systems interacting with environment can be represented by a 
changing density operator ρ(t) (Percival 1999, pp. 44-51).14 When 
physicists unravel a density matrix, they want to spell out a specific 
example of an ensemble which is equivalent to the given density 
matrix. In the case of an ensemble of qubits (i.e. two-state quantum 
systems), represented by a density operator equal to half the 
identity matrix, the unravellings are given by: ρ = 1/2 = 1/2(|z+› + 
|z–›) (i.e. an ensemble that is an equal mixture of spin up and spin 
down in the z-direction) and ρ = 1/2 = 1/2(|x+› + |x–›)) (i.e. an 
ensemble that is an equal mixture of spin up and spin down in the 
x-direction). While an ensemble of quantum states has a density 
operator that satisfies a unique deterministic differential equation, 
the master equation corresponds to many different stochastic 
equations, i.e. different unravellings, for its components states 
(Percival 1999, p. 47). Unravelling the master equations means 
deriving a stochastic master equation from the master equation. 
Without further additional information about the environment, 
there is no way to choose one unravelling over the other (Spiller 
1994, p. 168). If we do have additional information about the 
environment, we can associate the individual stochastic quantum 
state trajectories with the behaviour of individual quantum systems 
in the ensemble. One way of doing this is provided by Quantum 
State Diffusion (QSD). In general, QSD produces localization of a 
                                                 
14
 Another way of representing it is as an ensemble of changing pure 
states |ψ(t)› with probability distribution Pr(ψ(t)). 
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quantum state as it evolves in time (Percival 1999; Spiller, 1994 
and 2002). If we obtain additional information about the 
environment that QSD is the preferred unravelling (compared to 
“quantum jumps” or other stochastic equations), we can unravel the 
master equation. The trajectories predicted by QSD are what you 
would expect if one were to make a particular set of measurements. 
Now, in order to formulate QSD one needs only the Hamiltonian 
and the Lindblad operators. The former represent the (internal) 
deterministic dynamics due to the change of ρ; the latter represent 
the effect of the (external) stochastic dynamics due to interaction 
with the environment (Percival 1999, p. 45). In order to arrive at 
exact equations one has to introduce idealizing conditions. A 
common idealizing assumption is that there is no system-
environment interaction so that the Lindblads can be ignored and 
only the Hamiltonians remain. 15  One can then further add the 
idealizing condition that the future of a system is only determined 
by its present state – in this case a system has Markov-behaviour. 
For the actual unravelling, we introduce the additional idealizing 
condition that the hypothetical measurements do not affect the 
system. The trajectories predicted by QSD are what you would 
expect if one were to make a particular set of measurements. It is 
obvious that unravelling the master equation by means of QSD 
involves several idealizing and abstracting conditions which 
characterize an ideal state of affairs . Under  the trajectories 
that one would expect if one were to make certain measurements 
are derived. Note, however, that here  involves a higher-order 
limiting case: one does not derive trajectories simpliciter, but the 
expected trajectories if one were to make measurements. 
My characterization of scientific representation is clearly 
sufficient for scientific representation. If we accept that all 
scientific representations posit ceteris paribus and ceteris 
absentibus conditions, then it is also necessary for scientific 
representation. Additionally, the limiting case account has the right 
                                                 
15
 In the opposite limit, one assumes that the system is only determined by 
its environment so that the Hamiltonians can be ignored and only the Lindblads 
remain. 
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logical properties of representation: to wit, asymmetry, non-
reflexivity and non-transitivity (Suárez 2003, pp. 232-233; Frigg, 
2006, pp. 60-61): given my characterization of scientific 
representations as limiting cases, M is a limiting case of T but not 
the other way around, M cannot be a limiting case of itself, and 
since it is impossible that T is a limiting case of another M and that 
M is a limiting case of another M, transitivity is ruled out. 16 
Moreover, the limiting case approach is able to account for 
misrepresentation, which refers to the fact that scientific 
representations are approximate or inaccurate in certain respects 
and to certain degrees, for the fact that models are idealizations and 
abstractions of their real-world targets is explicitly incorporated in 
my characterization of scientific representation. The limiting case 
account of scientific representation indeed squares nicely with the 
view that scientific representations involve idealizations and 
abstractions. As is commonly understood, scientific models 
presuppose certain conditions of which are strictly speaking false 
(Cartwright 1983). For instance, although we know that the earth is 
not a perfect sphere, in many Newtonian models we treat the earth 
as if it is a sphere. Similarly, the simple pendulum model provides 
an abstract and idealized description which assumes a zero air 
resistance and a very small angle of swing. To take another 
example, by means of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium allele and 
genotype frequencies in a non-evolving population can be 
determined. Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium assumes that there is 
completely random mating and that there is no genetic mutation, 
natural selection, genetic migration or gene flow – conditions 
which do not hold in actual populations. 
The above account also explains scientific representations’ 
capacity for surrogate reasoning. By cutting loose from the 
complexities of the real world, scientific representations stipulate 
                                                 
16
 The formal criteria for transitivity are: if A → B and B → C then A → C. 
When the arrow denotes the relation ‘is a limiting case of,’ then we have: if 
Model1 → Target1 and Target1 → Model2 then Model1 → Model2. However, as 
the semantics of the limiting case approach rules out that Target1 → Model2 and 
Model1 → Model2, transitivity cannot obtain. 
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an ideal state of affairs in which certain relations, which cannot be 
directly inferred from the messy empirical world, can be inferred in 
an exact way. Scientific representations deliberately abstract from 
and idealize features of the physical world. This means that not all 
the features of a system are included (in the case of abstraction) and 
some of its features are deliberately distorted (in the case of 
idealization). Under such ceteris paribus and ceteris absentibus 
conditions, inferences can be drawn and relations can be 
established in a cognitive context where we do not have to deal 
with the full complexity of the real world. 
 
5.3 The Normative Question of Scientific Representation 
 
Readers will have noticed that I have said nothing on the conditions 
under which r obtains approximately for  relative to a purpose P. 
The reason for this is straightforward: the issue of whether r holds 
sufficiently approximately pertains to the normative question of 
scientific representation. The particular goals at hand determine the 
degree of approximation we require from a scientific representation.  
If our goals are very demanding, then we will require a very 
high degree of approximation. If, on the other hand, our goals aim 
only at giving a rough sketch, we will be satisfied with a lower 
degree of approximation. For instance, if we only want a rough 
sketch of a pendulum’s gravitational force – let us say for 
educational means – we will use a very simple model. The standard 
simple pendulum model can be a perfectly appropriate model in the 
context of an introductory course in physics. By using the simple 
pendulum model, we assume that the cord of length l is mass-less 
and that there is no air resistance. The period T is then given by the 
formula T = 2 × π × ( 

)1/2 = 2 × 

, where ω refers to the angular 
frequency. Suppose now that in another context our goals are very 
stringent – for instance, consider the case of engineers who want to 
produce a detailed picture of the pendulum as a physical system for 
a particular technological application. One way to arrive at a more 
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‘realistic’17 model would be to incorporate the mass distribution. In 
this case, the period could be determined by the formula: T = 2 × π 
× ( 
	×		×	
)1/2, where I is the inertia around the axis of rotation, m 
the total mass, and h the distance from the axis and the centre of 
mass. If still not sufficiently detailed, we could add further factors 
to our pendulum model. There is no end to this process: one cannot 
include all necessary correction factors in one model.18 
Given their inherent goal-dependency, the question of 
whether scientific representations are successful or adequate 
depends on the specifics of the goal which we seek to establish. 
This entails that there can be no general theoretical answer to the 
normative question of scientific representation.  
Nevertheless, although scientific models abstract from and 
idealize properties of the natural world, we can determine 
empirically whether the features not covered by our model are 
indeed irrelevant with respect to a particular purpose. For instance, 
in the example of the simple pendulum model we can establish 
whether air resistance will significantly invalidate the results 
derived from this model by means of experimental set-ups given a 
purpose at hand. Comparison of pendulums in vacuo and 
pendulums on earth indeed shows that the deviations resulting from 
air resistance are for some purposes practically negligible – 
however, not necessarily for all purposes. Scientific representations 
are constructed by human minds, but good ones are tested in the 
empirical world. More precisely, their inferential consequences and 
the non-significance of the factors, which they idealize or abstract 
from, can be confronted with phenomena and ascertained to be 
acceptable or not, in view of a purpose at hand. It is this process 
                                                 
17
 The quotation marks indicate that my proposal is neutral with respect to 
the realism-instrumentalism debate. It is highly desirable that an account of the 
normative problem of scientific representation is independent from the realism-
instrumentalism debate – and equally so for an account of the constitution 
problem of scientific representation: for both realists and instrumentalists models 
represent scientifically. 
18
 Adam Morton has nicely discussed this idea in the context of 
atmospheric models (Morton 1993, pp. 660-662). 
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which truly filters out adequate scientific representations, relative 
to specific cognitive and practical purposes. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
By now I have explicated the pragmatic higher-order limiting case 
account, which, as I have tried to argue, provides an adequate 
treatment of the constitution problem of scientific representation. I 
have also highlighted its benefits and I have also explained why it 
fares better than its competitors: the inferential account, the 
interpretational account, the pragmatic similarity account, and the 
partial isomorphism account. If correct, my account provides a 
more adequate way to explicate scientific representation – at least, 
the debate on whether it does can now begin. 
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